摘要
作者以1999年至2004年IPO的84家金字塔结构的民营企业为研究样本,研究金字塔型控股结构对民营企业首次公开发行(IPO)后长期市场表现的影响,并试图从不同角度阐述长期市场表现变化的原因。作者发现,从短期来看,金字塔式的组织结构越复杂,民营企业IPO抑价程度越大。从长期来看,金字塔结构越复杂的发行公司越倾向于用后续的关联交易,尤其是通过非经营性的关联交易从上市公司中收回现金,来补偿民营企业家在IPO抑价中损失的财富。
The author takes 84 IPO private enterprises with Pyramidal structure from 1999 to 2004 as samples, researches the effect of Pyramidal structure on the long - term market representation of private enterprises after IPO and tries to expatiate on the reasons for the long - term change in market representation from different perspectives. The author finds that in the short run the more complex the Pyramidal Structure is, the more under - pricing will happen during IPO. In the long run, the offering companies with more complex pyramidal structure tend to take back cash from listed companies with subsequent connected transaction, especially non - management connected transaction and make up for private entrepreneurs' loss in IPO underpricing.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第5期114-116,共3页
Economic Survey
关键词
IPO抑价
最终控制入
金字塔结构
IPO under- pricing
ultimate controller
pyramid structure