信贷决策机制中的担保人的经济意义分析

ECONOMIC ANALYSES FOR A CO SIGNER IN CREDIT DECISION MECHANISM

讨论在不完全信息下完全竞争的信贷市场中，当借款方不能提供银行方所需抵押品时，借款方引入担保人后的经济意义．给出了在对风险的均值保持展形［５～７］的刻画下，借款方引入担保人后，银行的信贷决策机制．揭示了在此机制作用下，银行方可以消除信贷配给并给出了在此机制作用下。

This paper gives economic analyses for a co signer in the credit market with imperfect information,when low risk borrowers own wealth is not large enough to fully accommodate the banks collateral requirement.The principle objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the presence of a co signer who increases collateral availability may eliminate the possibility of rationing.The condition that the decision mechanism of credit involving a co signer dominates the one without a co signer is also given.The risk description in this paper is based on the concept of “mean preserving spread”.