双边道德风险条件下科技人员的激励薪酬契约

On the Incentive Salary Contracts for Technician with Double-sided Moral Hazard

文章利用现代契约经济学的基本理论,对双边道德风险条件下科技人员的线性激励薪酬契约设计的内在规律进行了分析。分析表明,在理论和实践两方面,线性激励薪酬契约都有广泛存在的合理性。同时,文章根据研究结论并结合中国实际,给出了相应的规范性建议。

Using basic theories of modern contract economics, this paper analyzes the inner rule of linear salary incentive contracts for technician under the conditions of bilateral moral hazard. It shows that linear salary incentive contracts are widely in demand. Finally, this paper provides some canonical countermeasures and suggestions according to the reality of China.