大股东对盈余指标存在选择偏好吗?

Do Blockholders Have Choice Preference to Different Earnings Indexes?

作为转轨经济中公司治理的核心,大股东制衡机制对盈余管理和盈利质量存在重要影响。本文选择每股收益和主营业务利润率作为两类不同盈余指标的代表,以来自中国股市的经验证据研究发现:(1)控股股东持股比例(第一大股东比例)越高,上市公司每股收益越高,而主营业务利润率越低;(2)其他大股东持股比例和对第一大股东(或前两大股东)的制衡度(或联合制衡度)越高,上市公司每股收益越低,而主营业务利润率越高。这表明,不同的大股东对不同类型的盈余指标存在选择偏好:控股股东可能偏好市场和投资者反应程度较为显著,盈余管理空间较大且相对易于操纵的盈余指标;而与之相反,其他大股东持股比例和大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)越高,越有可能抵制控股股东的盈余管理或利润操纵行为。

As the core of corporate governance in transition economy, mechanism of blockholders counterbalance has important impacts on earnings management or profit manipulation. In this paper, we select eamings per share （EPS） and operating profit margin （OPE） to represent two kinds of earning indices, then according to empirical evidences from Chinese stock market we find that ： （ 1 ） Shareholding percent of the controlling shareholder （the largest shareholder） is positively associated with EPS while negatively associated with OPE; （2） Shareholding percent of other blockholders and counterbalance degrees （or combined counterbalance degrees） to the largest shareholder （the top 2 shareholders） are negatively associated EPS while positively associated with OPE. These empirical findings indicate that different blockholders have choice preference to different earnings indices ： （ 1 ） The controlling shareholders prefer earnings indices which investors pay great attention to and which have bigger space for earnings management or profit manipulation. （2） On the contrary, shareholding percent and counterbalance degrees （or combined counterbalance degrees ） of other blockholders are positively associated with the likelihood of resisting earnings management or profit manipulation by the controlling shareholders.