摘要
西汉私营商业具有促进农业手工业生产、加强区域分工、实现社会储备、帮助国家财政货币化等重要经济功能,这使其有条件与国家进行博弈。西汉经济发展水平确定了商业的总体规模,从而也限定了私商的发展空间。国家与私商的利益冲突导致抑商政策,其目的是将商利从私商转移于国家手中。在国家与私商的博弈中,双方各有多种策略选择,作为主导方的国家通过"试错"找到了最佳策略,在国家与私商之间实现了最优策略均衡。
Private commerce in the West Han Dynasty was able to compete with the State because its important role in promoting agricultural and handicraft production, strengthening regional distribution of production, actualizing social reserves and helping monetize State finance. The level of economic growth in the day restricted the general scale of commerce and limited the space of growth of private commerce. As a result, conflicts between interests of the State and private merchants led to implementation of a commerce-oppressing policy to transfer merchant profits from private merchants to the State. In such conflicts, the State as the leading party found the best strategy and realized a strategic balance between the State and private merchants.
出处
《陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第5期43-49,共7页
Journal of Shaanxi Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
西汉私营商业
国家
博弈
the West Han Dynasty private commerce
the State
competition