声誉激励机制对投资管理人的激励约束效应研究——从全国社会保障基金理事会的角度

Restrained Effect of Reputation Incentive Mechanism on the Incentive to Fund Investment Supervisors

全国社会保障基金理事会投资管理地位已经确立,那么就与其投资管理人形成了一个委托—代理关系。根据博弈论可知,若企业家只是重视短期利益,不注重其自身的声誉,在短期内可能获得最大化利润,但从中长期看来却不能。建立有效的投资管理人声誉机制,则可以有效解决投资管理人个人收益函数与全国社保基金会的利益函数不一致性问题。在Meyer和Vickers所建立的声誉机制模型的基础上,通过引入声誉机制,建立了基金投资管理人声誉机制模型。阐述了其对全国社会保障基金理事会在激励投资管理人方面发挥的重要作用。针对声誉机制的机理,提出了为更好地发挥该机制作用的几点建议。

The Board of Directors of the National Social Insurance Fund （NSIF） has been established, then a commission-agency relation come into being to the fund investment supervisors. According to the game theory, a fund investor could gain the short-term maximum profit but couldn＇t gain the medium/long-term one if he just makes account of his short-term invest and doesn＇t think much of his reputation. So, building an efficient reputation incentive mechanism is important to an investment supervisor, by which the problem that the individual revenue function of a supervisor is inconsistent with the NSIF＇ s interests function can be solved efficiently. Based on the reputation incentive mechanism model developed by Meyer and Vickers, a reputation mechanism model is developed for fund investment supervisors, and what an important role it plays in restraining the incentive to the supervisors is described. Some suggestions are given to enable the mechanism to function better.