中国公司法董事信托义务制度评析--以英美公司法相关理论与实践为视角

Analysis of Director's Fiduciary Duties in the Corporation Act of China in the Perspective of Anglo-American Corporation Law

中国新公司法董事信托义务制度设计在董事与公司关系界定上突破了传统委任关系理论之束缚而采用英美公司法的信托关系理论。但由于新公司法注意义务的成文化徒具形式,缺乏行为标准与审查标准之界分,董事赔偿责任要件模糊不清,未能引入商业判断规则,因而无法清晰界定商业决策权与司法审查权之作用边界,协调董事职权与责任之价值冲突,实现董事信托义务之制度功能。为此,我国应当从强化董事注意义务中的监督职责、引入商业判断规则、营造社会外部环境等方面逐步加以完善公司法。

The Revised Corporation Act of China threw off the restraint of traditional commission theory and adopted the fiduciary manner to define the relationship between directors and their corporations in accordance to the Anglo-American Corporation Law. However, in the new act, the provisions of director＇s duty are just emphasized in literal form but lack the distinction between standards of conduct and standards of review. Thus, the essentials of director＇s liability for compensation are vague and the business judgment rule is not included. As a result, the institutional design fails to distinguish clearly the functional boundary between the business decision-making power and the judicial review power so as to harmonize the value conflicts between director＇s authority and liability and realize the institutional functions of director＇s fiduciary duties. So, we ought to perfect director＇s duties in our Corporation Act by strengthening director＇s oversight duty, introducing business judgment rule and building more adaptable social surroundings.