内生无效制度--对进入壁垒和贸易保护的思考

Endogenous Inefficient Institutions

本文构建一个模型来考察为什么垄断、进入壁垒和贸易保护在许多国家长期存在。政治精英对中间产品索取高价的偏好导致了支持垄断和贸易保护的无效经济制度和政治制度。价格操纵机制表明,政治精英偏好于通过提高中间产品价格来增加垄断利润。提高税率虽然会增加政治精英的税收收入,但会降低对中间产品的需求,从而减少垄断利润。因此,价格操纵情况下的最优税率低于收入摄取情况下的最优税率,这与Acemoglu(2006)的结论相反。

Following Acemoglu （2006）, we construct a simple model to investigate how the elite＇s preference for high intermediate good price translates into inefficient economic institutions and political institutions. Price manipulation mechanism implies that the elite prefer to high profits through monopoly pricing. An increase in tax rate declines the demand for intermediate good from the middle class, hence reducing monopoly profits, hence the price manipulation motive always decreases taxes to below the pure revenue-maximizing level, which is opposite to the case in Acemoglu （2006） .