摘要
There is a long history of the dualism of appearance and reality in philosophy. For this dualism, one of the main sources is the so-called argument from illusion. The argument aims to extend the case of hallucination to all of perceptual experience. However, this extension is endorsed upon a dubious assumption, namely, the common kind assumption. If we reject the assumption, we will get a new kind of theory of perception, namely, disjunctivism. Disjunctivism believes that veridical perception and illusion or hallucination is fundamentally the different kind of states. Accordingly, the possibility of hallucination does not affect the cognitive contacts between mind and world in case of veridical perception. In terms of disjunctivism, skepticism is not worthy of worries so much as traditional epistemology has ever been done.
There is a long history of the dualism of appearance and reality in philosophy. For this dualism, one of the main sources is the so-called argument from illusion. The argument aims to extend the case of hallucination to all of perceptual experience. However, this extension is endorsed upon a dubious assumption, namely, the common kind assumption. If we reject the assumption, we will get a new kind of theory of perception, namely, disjunctivism. Disjunctivism believes that veridical perception and illusion or hallucination is fundamentally the different kind of states. Accordingly, the possibility of hallucination does not affect the cognitive contacts between mind and world in case of veridical perception. In terms of disjunctivism, skepticism is not worthy of worries so much as traditional epistemology has ever been done.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第9期93-99,共7页
Philosophical Research
