供应链合作产品开发中的双边道德风险与报酬契约设计

Double moral hazard and compensatory contract design for collaborative product development in supply chain

在双边道德风险模型下,研究供应链合作产品开发中报酬契约的设计。在报酬契约设计中,同时考虑了供应商努力的动机以及制造商自身努力的动机。契约中通过一个部件技术价格,实现了制造商与供应商间产品收益的转移,分享产出,同时通过一个固定补贴费用,满足供应商参与开发的约束。结果表明,这一最优契约中的部件技术价格随供应商研发努力的成本参数降低,随制造商努力成本参数增加。

Within the framework of double moral hazard, the design of compensatory contract for collaborative product development in supply chain has been studied. When designing the compensatory contract, the incentive of supplier＇ s effort and the incentive of manufacture＇ s own effort are taken into consideration. Through a component technology price, the contracts realize transfer of some product revenue between the manufacture and supplier, share the output ; and through a fixed subsidy fee to meet the constraint for supplier＇ s participation in the development. Result shows that the component technology price in the optimal contract decreases with the supplier＇ s cost parameter of R＆D effort, and the price increases with the manufacture＇ s cost parameter of R＆D effort.