我国税法在执行过程中为何出现扭曲——来自博弈论的证据

Why China's Tax Laws Are Distorted in the Enforcement Process——Evidence from Game Theory

税务机关内部部门利益膨胀的问题目益彰显,导致税法在执行层面出现扭曲。从公共选择理论的政府为理性经济人的前提入手,采用博弈论的方法,建立一个博弈模型,对部门之间有关税法的执行行为展开分析,展现各个博弈主体的策略和行为。探寻政府部门税收政策扭曲产生的原因,为依法治税问题提供一个新的研究视角及理论解释。

The departmental benefit of tax organs inflating indicate that tax laws are distorted in the enforcement process. With game theory and the premise that government are rational economic men in public choice theory, it establishes a Game Model, analyzes departments＇ behaviors in the enforcement process of the tax law, shows all main game strategy, seeks the reasons why tax policy distortions in the departments. It provided a new angle of view and theoretical explanation for tax management according to law.