外部掠夺下的国防开支与经济增长

Defense Expenditure and Economic Growth under External Predations

本文建立了一个国际冲突环境中的一国经济长期增长模型。模型假定国际环境为霍布斯状态，一国不得不时刻面临外部掠夺，而阻止外部掠夺的唯一途径是投资国防。掠夺者、政府和家庭的动态博弈均衡决定了长期增长路径。分析表明，国际和国内因素两个层次的均衡决定了长期均衡增长路径；均衡增长路径可分为屈服均衡、容忍均衡和完全防卫均衡三个阶段；政府不同的国防战略会导致不同的增长图景，经济持续增长将导致国防战略的调整。

This paper develops a growth model of a country under a Hobbesian environment of international conflicts where national defense is the only way to prevent external predations. The long-run growth path is determined by the equilibrium of a dynamic game with three players, the external predator, the government and the family. The equilibrium growth path has three phases, subjection, toleration, and full defense. Different defense strategies result in different growth prospects and sustained growth will endogenously induce changes of defense strategies.