现金流权、超额控制与公司经营绩效

Cash Flow Rights,Excess Control and Corporate Operating Performance

以2002-2006年我国民营上市公司1214个观察值为研究对象，实证检验了终极控制股东现金流权、超额控制程度对公司经营绩效的影响。研究表明：我国民营上市公司终极控制股东超额控制现象较为严重；终极控制股东的现金流权具有正的激励效应，与公司经营绩效正相关；终极控制股东的超额控制具有负的堑壕效应，与公司经营绩效负向关。

Using a 1214 corporate - level dataset of Chinese private listed companies over the period of 2002 - 2006, this paper examines how cash flow rights and excess control of ultimate controlling shareholder influence corporate operating performance. The results show that： the excess control extent is very serious in Chinese private listed companies; the cash flow right has the positive ＂incentive effect＂ and positive to corporate operating performance; the excess control extent has the negative ＂entrenchment effect＂ and negative to corporate operating performance. Based on this, the paper proposed some policy suggestions.