摘要
Washington had all along followed an ambiguity policy over its possible military intervention in a Taiwan contingency.However,recent years have witnessed readjustments towards'double clarity'of a possible military response in case of a Chinese-initiated use of force and potential inaction in the event of a conflict derived from Taiwan Residents provocations to change the status quo by seeking de jure independence.In other words,it spells a policy shift toward'dual deterrence,'namely to deter the Chinese mainland from using force in seeking national reunification and to deter Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence.To prevent such eventuality,Washington made direct appeal to the Taiwan public to make clear its opposition to Taiwan independence. The reasons behind the readjustments are not far to seek.They reflect shifts in U.S.strategic focus,changes in its China policy,political developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and President Bush's personal disgust with former Taiwan leader Chen Shuibian's cunning tricks. However,resumption of Cross-Strait dialogue in the wake of the return to power of the Kuomintang (National Party) through the ballot in March may bring about new worries and possible further readjustments in U.S.cross-strait policy after the November presidential elections.Though uncertainties remain,in the pipeline may be an endeavor to prevent excessive cross-strait warmth and a possible tilt of Taiwan to the Chinese Mainland.
Washington had all along followed an ambiguity policy over its possible military intervention in a Taiwan contingency. However, recent years have witnessed readjustments towards＂ ＂double clarity＂ of a possible military response in case of a Chinese-initiated use of force and potential inaction in the event of a conflict derived from Taiwan Residents provocations to change the status quo by seeking de jure independence. In other words, it spells a policy shift toward ＂dual deterrence,＂ namely to deter the Chinese mainland from using force in seeking national reunification and to deter Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence. To prevent such eventuality, Washington made direct appeal to the Taiwan public to make clear its opposition to Taiwan independence.
The reasons behind the readjustments are not far to seek. They reflect shifts in U.S. strategic focus, changes in its China policy, political developments on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and President Bush＇s personal disgust with former Taiwan leader Chen Shuibian＇s cunning tricks.
However, resumption of Cross-Strait dialogue in the wake of the return to power of the Kuomintang （National Party） through the ballot in March may bring about new worries and possible further readjustments in U.S. cross-strait policy after the November presidential elections. Though uncertainties remain, in the pipeline may be an endeavor to prevent excessive cross-strait warmth and a possible tilt of Taiwan to the Chinese Mainland.
