摘要
本文从克里普克所攻击的所谓"弗雷格—罗素的描述主义传统"出发,比较了弗雷格和罗素在处理单词词项的语义值方面的分歧并检讨了背后的方法论进路的差异:对于弗雷格,其涵义指称区分的二层次意义理论的基础是以"求真"为核心的数学—逻辑哲学;对于罗素,以"亲知原则"为典型特征的认识论立场则是其指称理论的出发点。文章进一步比较了弗雷格式思想和罗素式命题的不同特征并讨论了它们对新指称理论的影响。
The paper compares Russel's theory of reference with Frege's theory. The author wants to show that the motive of Russel's proposition came from‘the principle of acquaintance', while Frege's thought was deeply rooted in his philosophy of mathematics and logic. The divergence between their ways of dealing with Frege's sense leads to the opposition between neo-Fregean camp and neo-Russelian camp.
出处
《学术研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第9期28-33,共6页
Academic Research
基金
中山大学人文社会科学青年教师桐山基金项目"内涵语境中的指称问题研究"的阶段性成果。
