基于股权--债权条件下风险投资的激励机制分析

The Incentive Scheme Analysis of Venturel Capital under Equity-Debt

运用博弈论中委托—代理理论对股权—债权条件下风险投资的激励机制进行了系统分析.根据风险投资家提供股权—债权与风险企业家提供股权融资的假设条件构造了一个基本博弈模型,并对模型进行了推广.研究发现:风险企业家的投资不仅有融资功能,而且还可以作为一种信号传递改变风险投资家的投资信念,使之对项目前景更乐观;扩展模型比基本模型更能改善风险企业家的投资行为,使之投入更多资金和给予风险投资家更高激励;此外,扩展模型更能消除股权—债权投资比例的相互替代性.

The paper analyses systemically incentive scheme of venture capital under equity- debt by applying principal-agent theory in game theory. According to some hypothesis that a capitalist provides a combination of equity and debt financing while a entrepreneur provides equity financing, a basic game model is established and the model is extended. Some results are found that investment of the entrepreneur not only has financing function, but also may improve faith of the venture capitalist make them be more optimistic. The investment behavior of the entrepreneur is more improved under the circumstances of the extending model than that under the basic model. The entrepreneur would like to devote more capital and pay more pay- offs to the venture capitalists. Furthermore, the extending model avoids the substitution between the proportions of equity-debt investment.