WTO环境下两家税务机关与纳税企业的三方博弈

Games between Tax Administrations and Enterprises

本文以加入WTO后建设服务型政府为背景,以两个税务机关和纳税企业三方为博弈参与者,以是否开展稽查工作为税务机关竞争策略,以经营收入是否转移和是否偷逃税款为企业竞争策略,建立博弈模型,深入研究。文章分两个层次,第一层次重点分析了税务机关与纳税企业两方博弈,指出没有替代税务机关的情况下,稽查工作与企业依法纳税的关系;第二层重点分析了两个税务机关以及纳税企业的三方博弈,指明了因为有多个税务机关相互竞争,使得纳税企业坐收"渔翁之利"的情况,并提出了相应政策建议。

This paper studies the behavioral difference between two tax administrations and an enterprise and how the difference affects the behaviors of the enterprise based on the game theory. The two tax administrations want to obtain the maximum taxation income to compete with each other. The enterprise that wants to obtain the maximum profit after taxation can choose the place it operates and also decide whether it pays the tax by the tax law. The game model suggests that enterprise will get more profit when two tax administrations compete with each other. Then, the author gives some advice on settling the problems.