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自省主体对Moore-型信息的处理与融合 被引量：1

Introspective Agents' Treatment of Moorean Type Information and Its Incorporation
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摘要 主体的信念状态随着世界的改变和新信息的输入等因素在不断地演化,对于信念状态变化规律的描述和形式刻画在一定程度上可以帮助我们模拟人类等具有的高级智能,从而为计算机人工智能这样的学科提供理论基础,对哲学、逻辑学等本身的发展也有一定的理论意义。这里我们考察具有足够推理能力的完全自省主体在信念修正过程中对Moore-型信息的处理规律,即把相应主体信念状态的Moore-型断定作为新信息输入,用来修正原来的信念状态。经典的AGM理论可以较好地刻画不含模态算子的客观信息的修正。然而,如果把主体信念状态中的信息和用来修正的新信息的形式扩大到模态的情况,"成功"和"一致性"公设不可能同时成立。为此,我们首先讨论自省主体i在自己的信念状态和客观事实的信念的不同组合情况下,对涉及自身信念状态的Moore-型信息A∧┐BiA的修正可能与结果。然后选出其中有意义的过程,定义和说明一种弱化的"成功"版本——"不成功修正";并且在继承经典AGM某些公设的基础上,给出上述修正过程的局部描述。此外,我们还将结合动态信念逻辑等工具,试图给出上述修正过程的逻辑表达。 This paper discusses the issue of belief dynamics when rational introspective agents incorporate with the Moorean type new information. We attempt to deal with the Moorean type new information for revision within the frame- work of DEL （DDL）. Several unsuccessful ways are presented though we still keep the principle of ＂the priority of new information＂ from the view of traditional belief revision. We conclude that some special kind of success （weak success ） can be found in those revision processes although absolute success and consistency postulates do not hold at the same time. Finally, a relevant problem ＂learnahility＂ is re--considered with the help of weak success.
作者 郭佳宏
机构地区 北京师范大学价值与文化研究中心
出处 《北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2008年第5期84-89,共6页 Journal of Beijing Normal University(Social Sciences)
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年项目"基于自然语言的信念修正和知识更新逻辑研究"(07JC720401)
关键词 信念修正 自省主体 Moore--型信息 不成功修正 弱成功 belief revision introspection moorean type information unsuccessful revision weak success
分类号 B81 [哲学宗教—逻辑学]
  • 相关文献

参考文献16

  • 1ALCHOURRON C E, GARDENFORS P. and MAK- INSON D. On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions[J]. J. Symbolic Logic 50 (1985), 510--530.
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二级参考文献34

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同被引文献19

  • 1C. Alchourron, P. Gardenfors, and D. Makinson, "On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions", in Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50:510 -530, 1985.
  • 2S. O. Hansson, "Changes in Preference", in Theory and Decision, 38:1 -28, 1995.
  • 3A. Baltag, L S. Moss, and S. Solecki, "The Logic of Common Knowledge, Public Announcements, and Private Suspicions", in I. Gilboa, editor, Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge ( TARK 98), pages 43 -56, 1998.
  • 4H. van Ditmarsch, W. van aer Hoek, and B. Kooi, Dynamic Epistemic Logic, Berlin: Springer, 2007.
  • 5J. van Benthem, Logical Dynamics of Information Flow, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (to appear ) , 2009.
  • 6J. van Benthem, "Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision", in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic, 17 : 129 - 156, 2007.
  • 7A. Baltag and S. Smets, "Dynamic Belief Revision over Multi-agent Plausibility Models", in Proceedings of the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of C, ame and Decision Theory ( LOFT 06), Liverpool, 2006.
  • 8F. Liu: Changing for the Better: Preference Dynamics and Agent Diversity, Ph. D dissertation, ILLC, University of Amsterdam. 2008.
  • 9T. Yamada, "Logical Dynamics of Some Speech Acts That Affect Obligations and Preferences", in J. van Benthem, S. Ju, and F. Veltman, editors, A Meeting of the Minds-Proceedings of the Workshop on Logic, Rationality and Interaction, pages 275 - 289, King's College Publications, 2007.
  • 10R. Fagin, J.Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Y. Vardi, Reasoning about Knowledge, The MIT Press, 1995.

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北京师范大学学报（社会科学版）
2008年 第5期

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