摘要
运用委托代理理论,研究了非对称信息条件下,由单供应商单分销商组成的供应链Pareto优化问题.在假定分销商所面临的需求是与销售价格有关的随机变量,以及供、销双方关于分销商销售价格信息不对称这两个前提下,将供应商作为委托人,分销商作为代理人,给出了供应商为吸引销售商选择对自己最有利的销售价格而设计的最优激励合同,比较了在不同信息条件下供销双方的最优决策.最后,给出了应用实例和灵敏度分析.
This paper considers the Pareto optimization problem in one-supplier-one-buyer supply chain by using principal-agent theory under asymmetric information. The supplier' s optimal incentive contract is present with supplier as principal and buyer as agent under the assumption that the stochastic demand faced by the buyer is correlated to his selling price and both sides with asymmetric information about buyer's selling price. The comparison of the optimal decisions of the supplier and the buyer between different information cases is provided. A practical example and sensitivity analysis of parameters are presented in the end.
出处
《控制与决策》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2008年第10期1163-1167,共5页
Control and Decision
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(70471045)
新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-05-0557)
高等学校全国优秀博士论文作者专项基金项目(200565)
高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(20060359007)