密封拍卖机制下的道德风险问题研究
摘要
本文以拍卖理论共同价值模型为基本分析框架,通过引入卖方委托代理关系,讨论了密封拍卖机制下竞买人信息寻租以及代理人道德风险对拍卖期望收入的影响。本文的主要结论包括:就控制道德风险而言,第二价格密封拍卖优于第一价格密封拍卖;拍卖品共同价值的大小决定了线性报酬激励合同的效果;特定情况下,竞买人的信息寻租行为有助于提高集体福利。
出处
《经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第5期110-121,共12页
Economic Science
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