信号对契约设计及福利的影响研究

Study on signals' effect on contract design and welfare performance

与代理人类型有一定程度相关性的信号能够改变委托人的初始信息结构并因此影响委托人的契约设计.现有文献很少讨论事前不可验证的信号对契约参与者事前福利的影响.相比对事后福利的研究,对事前福利的研究在契约设计中更具有现实意义.文章研究了信号对契约参与者事前福利的影响.结果表明:委托人通过对信号的观察改进契约会提高委托人的事前期望剩余;委托人的初始信息结构和信号的信息量是影响代理人事前期望剩余的关键因素;在一定的严格条件下,委托人对信号的观察能够增加代理人的事前期望剩余,即实现事前期望福利的帕累托改进.

Signals that have correlation in a certain extent with agent＇ s styles can change principal＇ s information structure and then affect the contract design of the principal. The existing literatures seldom discussed the effect of ex ante non-certified signals on participants＇ ex ante welfare. Compared with researches on ex post welfare, research on ex ante welfare has much more real meaning in contract design. Through research on ex ante welfare, this paper finds that. through the observation of signals, a principal can change his contract design and improve his ex ante surplus. The initial information structure of principal and the quantity of information in signals can significantly affect an agent＇ s ex ante surplus. Under certain strict conditions, through principal＇ s observation of signals, an agent＇ sex ante surplus can increase, or in other words, the principal can implement ex ante welfare＇ s Pareto improvement.