管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率--来自中国上市公司的证据

Managerial Power, Perquisite Consumption and Perfor-mance of Property Right: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

国外近年大量研究表明,薪酬激励并不必然解决代理问题,薪酬的制定与执行机制可能使其成为代理问题的一部分。具体而言,管理层可能利用其权力影响甚至自定薪酬,从而寻租最终降低了薪酬的激励效用,中国的制度背景也为上述现象提供了可能。本文利用2001-2004年我国上市公司数据实证检验了管理层权力对于作为隐性薪酬的在职消费以及企业绩效的影响。从董事长总经理两职兼任、股权分散和高管长期在位视角构建了管理层权力的综合计量指标,研究中运用了普通最小二乘法和广义矩估计方法,并进行了稳健性检验。本文的研究结果表明,管理层权力是影响薪酬激励及其绩效的重要因素,我国要重视管理层权力及其引起的过度职务消费的治理问题,民营控股企业的内部权力治理不容忽视。

Recent Western studies show that compensation incentives do not necessarily alleviate the agency problem and sometimes the determination and implementation of compensation mechanisms will itself contribute to the agency problem. Specifically, managers can use their power to seek rent, especially affecting and even de- termining their own compensation, and ultimately reduce the firm＇s performance. The Chinese institutional background, （including weak investor protection, insider control and social culture etc.）, makes the occurrence of this phenomena possible. We use data from the 2001-2004 annual reports of Chinese listed companies to test the effects of managerial power on perquisite consumption as an implicit compensation and also on the firm＇s performance. We establish a comprehensive indication of managerial power from the perspectives of CEO duality, ownership dispersion and long-term tenure of top executives. We employ the Ordinary Least Square （OLS） and Generalized Method of Moments （GMM） statistical methods. The empirical results show that, compared to other companies, companies with more managerial power incur a higher cost of perquisite consumption while their performance does not improve significantly. Moreover, perquisite consumption cannot offer effective incentives to managers, and private-owner-controlled listed companies have more managerial power and more perquisite consumption with worse performance than that of the state-owner-controlled listed companies. We conduct some related robustness checks, including different proxies for perquisite consumption and executive compensation. These results confirm our previous conclusion. Therefore, this study shows that managerial power is an important factor influencing compensation incentives. China should strengthen the governance of managerial power and its induced excess perquisite consumption, especially for private-owner- controlled listed companies. Although there are some limitations, this paper provides future researchers with preliminary evidence and a new perspective about the dynamic relationships between managerial power, compensation incentives and property rights.