股权制衡可以改善公司治理吗——基于公平与效率视角的实证检验

Can Check-and-balance Ownership Structure Improve Corporate Governance? An Empirical Study Based on the Perspective of Fairness and Efficiency

分析了股权制衡可能对公司带来的有利和不利影响,并使用我国上市公司2001-2007年的数据进行了检验。研究结果表明,股权制衡机制可以对大股东的侵占行为产生制约,减轻大股东对公司利益的侵占,从而保护小股东利益,增进公平。但同时,股权制衡会降低决策效率,对公司的经营绩效产生显著的负面影响,这种负面影响在国有控股的公司和业绩好的公司中更为明显。最优股权制衡程度的选择需要在股权制衡带来的提高公平和损失效率两种效应之间进行权衡。

This paper analyzes the advantageous and disadvantageous effects of the check and balance ownership structure, based on the data of China＇s listed firms from 2001 to 2007. The empirical results show that, the check and balance ownership structure can restrict expropriation, thus protect the benefits of minority shareholders. However, the presence of outside blockholders has significantly negative influences on company＇s operating performance, especially in the state-owned companies and well-performed companies. Therefore, the optimal ownership structure should be a trade-off between these two effects of enhancing fair and losing efficiency that are brought by the check and balance ownership structure.