消费者偏好不确定下的双寡头企业竞争策略

Competitive Strategy of Duopoly Enterprise under Uncertain Consumer Preference

在具有Stackelberg博弈均衡的Hotelling模型中,本文引入消费者偏好不确定性,研究其对企业竞争策略的影响。博弈的均衡结果表明:在消费者偏好不确定下,市场先进入者比后进入者获得更高的市场价格和利润;企业产品的均衡价格、利润、差异性和社会福利都随不确定性的增大而增大;在Stackelberg博弈均衡中获得的市场价格、利润、产品差异性和社会福利都大于在Nash博弈均衡中所获得的结果。

In Hotelling model with Stackelberg game, the paper introduces uncertainty consumer preference and studies its effect on competitive strategy of enterprises. The equilibrium results show that, under uncertainty of consumer preference, the first entrants obtain higher prices and profits than the new entrants; that the equilibrium price, profit, differentiation of products, and social welfare increase with the rise of uncertainty; and that price, profit, differentiation of products, and social welfare in Stackelberg game equilibrium are greater than those in Nash game equilibrium.