转型期中国国有商业银行规模不经济的政治经济学解释

A Political-Economic Explanation for State-Owned Commercial Banks' Lack of Scale Economy in China during the Transition Period

本文尝试从政治经济学的角度来解释改革开放以来中国国有商业银行高市场集中度、低盈利能力以及高不良资产率并存的事实。文章证明:在政治家主导的经济中,选择垄断性大银行是最优的;当政治家与银行家之间存在利益交换的途径时,政治家与银行家实现合谋,交换的金额取决于双方的谈判能力与合谋获得的租金;进一步,官员政绩考核方式的改变以及金融市场的开放都能削弱这种合谋的力量,并提高社会效率。

From the aspect of political economics, the paper states that there exist high market concentration rate, low profitability and high ratio of bad debts in state-owned commercial banks since reform and opening up. It extends the thoughts of Shleifer and Vishny about politicians and firms to the financial sector, and combines market structure with politicians＇ preference. The results show that the big monopoly banks are the optimal choose in the politician-led economy. When there exists a way to exchange benefits between politicians and bankers, politicians can be in cahoots with bankers. And the exchange amount depends on the negotiation power of two parties and the gross rent obtained through the collusion. Further more, both the change of officials＂ performance evaluation system and opening-up of financial market can weaken the collusion power and improve social efficiency.