MANET增强合作模型的理论研究

Theoretical Study with the Model for MANET Cooperation Enforcement

为了解决移动Ad hoc网络(MANET)中因保存能量而拒绝合作的节点自私性问题,对刺激合作的激励模型进行了研究,提出了将经济学上的委托一代理关系应用到Ad hoc网络的发报方与参与转发数据包的节点上.利用简化的博弈原理,使合作双方虚拟货币收支达到一定的纳什均衡.模型将刺激合作方案设计转化为发报方的最优激励合同设计问题,从而在理论上保证发报方以最小的成本设计一种机制,促使转发节点尽力工作,在一定程度上抑制了合作中的自私性行为.

To solve the selfishness problems caused in energy saving in mobile Ad hoe network （MANET）, an incentive model is studied by introducing the principal-agent theory into the relationship between the source nodes and the participating nodes. The income and outcome of both sides can reach the Nash equilibrium by using the simple game theory. This model changes the cooperation plan designing into the optimal incentive contract designing, with which the source nodes will theoretically take the lowest cost for making the participating nodes work hard. Therefore the selfishness can restrained to a certain degree.