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组织信息安全投资博弈的均衡分析 被引量:1

The Equilibrium Analysis of Organization Information Security Investment Game
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摘要 本文利用博弈理论进行信息安全投资的均衡分析,为解决信息安全的投资额度问题提供了一种新的思路。根据信息安全投资主体间的策略依存性建立组织的信息安全投资博弈模型,模型中关系参数的变化反映了两组织间博弈关系的变化,进而对于关系参数取值的不同情况,根据反应函数法进行博弈的均衡分析。特别地,对于攻防博弈关系,推导出组织信息安全投资的命题,并通过仿真进行验证分析。研究结果不仅解释了现实世界中的信息安全投资,而且为组织的信息安全投资额度提供了有益的指导。 Based on Game theory, this paper analyzes the equilibrium of information security investment, and provides a new method to solve the investment quantity of information security. It sets up the information security investment game model of the organizations according to the strategy interdependence, and the relation parameter in the model reflects the game relationship of two organizations, so the equilibrium analysis is made based on reaction function method according to the deferent value of relation parameter. In particular, for the attacker-defender game relationship, it brings forward a proposition of information security investment and makes simulation analysis. The research result not only explains the information security investment in the world, but also provides a good direction of the information security investment quantity for organizations.
出处 《运筹与管理》 CSCD 2008年第5期85-90,共6页 Operations Research and Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(60572111)
关键词 管理科学 均衡 博弈 信息安全 仿真 management science equilibrium game information security simulation
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参考文献8

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同被引文献8

  • 1Gordon L A, Loeb M P. The economics of information security investment[ J]. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 2002, 5(4)( November 2002): 438-457.
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  • 8姜伟,方滨兴,田志宏,张宏莉.基于攻防博弈模型的网络安全测评和最优主动防御[J].计算机学报,2009,32(4):817-827. 被引量:153

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