中国上市公司股权集中度、董事会独立性和公司绩效——基于结构方程模型的研究

Independence on the Board of Directors,Ownership Centralization and Corporate Performance in China: Study Based on Structural Equation Model

股权集中度与公司绩效的关系,董事会独立性与公司绩效的关系是公司治理中的重要内容。以往的实证研究仅检验这两个直接关系。实际上公司董事会独立性,股权集中度,和公司绩效存在三角关系。本文研究此三角关系,以我国沪深300指数成分股上市公司数据为样本应用结构方程模型进行实证检验。结果发现,股权集中度与董事会独立性为负向关系,董事会独立性与公司绩效为负向关系,股权集中度对公司绩效不但有直接影响而且通过董事会独立性产生间接影响。

Abstract：The relation between ownership centralization and corporate performance, and the relation between in- dependence on the board of directors and corporate performance are very important aspects in corporate governance. Most research only test the direct relation. But the triangle relation exists in them. In this paper, an empirical analysis based on the structural equation model is presented to study the triangle relation. The samples are data of corporates included in Shanghai and Shenzhen 300 Index . We find a negative correlation between ownership centralization and independence on the board of directors, a negative correlation between independence on the board of directors and corporate performance by the empirical analysis. Ownership centralization not only affects corporate performance directly but also indirectly by independence on the board of directors.