供应商管理库存应对突发事件

Vender Manage Inventory under Disruption

本文研究短生命周期供应链,它由一个生产商和一个销售商组成,供应商替销售商管理库存。首先指出供应商管理库存同样存在激励冲突,出现双边际效应,即分权决策下供应商的存货量小于供应链利润最大的库存量。接下来,提出一个使供应链达到合作的合约——未售货物补偿合约,即,销售商要对没有售完的货物进行补偿。该合约具有参数简单,管理费用低,且能将供应链利润在供应商和销售商之间任意分配。然后研究当突发事件导致供应商的生产费用(包括采购费用,运输费用等)发生变化对供应链的影响。最后,提出一个能应对突发事件并使供应链达到合作的合约。利用数值例子说明合约的价值。

This paper addresses a short--life supply chain which consists of one supplier and one retailer and in which the supplier manages the inventory. It is shown that incentive conflict and double marginal effect still exist in Vender Manage Inventory （VMI） mode. That is, the inventory stocked by the supplier under decentraiized decision is less than that in centralized decision. A coordinated contract--unsold recoup contract in which the retailer recoups the unsold inventory, is proposed. Then the impact of disruption, which changes the supplier＇s production cost （including procurement, transportation cost etc. ）, on supply chain is studied. A robust contract, which has anti--disruption ability, is proposed. Numerical experiments are done to illustrate the value of the contract.