下游零售商强势背景下的多对一供应链协调模型

A Multi-Supplier Single-Retailer Supply Chain Coordination Model with the Retailer Being Dominant

本文研究下游零售商强势背景下,包含多供应商、单零售商的供应链协调问题。首先,提炼出一类能够反映强势零售商运作特点的契约:主动向上调节生产商的生产行为以降低成本;根据市场需求变化积极调整订货;接下来借鉴斯塔尔伯格博弈的分析思路,得到了能够被强势零售商用来协调供应链的契约参数方程,并证明了该契约具有较强的供应链系统利润分配能力。最终结果表明,与一对一供应链相比,多个供应商之间的水平竞争在一定程度上减轻了零售商的协调压力,零售商可以通过更少的转移支付达到预期的协调目的。

This paper studies a multi--supplier and single--retailer supply chain coordination model, in which the retailer leads the supply chain and proactively coordinates the upstreamers＇ production behavior in order to lower their production cost. Additionally, the retailer would adjust his inventory level according to the market changes. With an analytical methodology under the Stackelherg Game, we derive the coordination equations and prove that the contracts we study are capable to realize a satisfying profit split between each party in the supply chain. The results show that the horizontal competition between suppliers can reduce the retailer＇s pressure for coordination and the retailer can achieve supply chain coordination through lower transfer payment.