稳定性与正当性

Stability and Legitimacy

稳定性问题,在罗尔斯前后期理论中均扮演重要角色,亦是他的政治自由主义转向的主要原因。但这却遭到评论者严厉的批评,认为罗尔斯将一个与道德证成无关的现实问题引入他的理论,不仅没有必要,而且会导致严重的道德妥协,甚至犯了最基本的概念错误。我指出,引致这种批评的原因,是因为罗尔斯没有将道德稳定性(关心正义感的优先性)和社会稳定性(关心社会秩序和延续性)作出清楚区分,并使人误以为前者只是后者的手段。我因此提出一种新的诠释,主张道德稳定性必须独立于社会稳定性,并有其内在于道德证成的重要性,而答案则在道德稳定性所要求的"正义感的优先性"。这种新的诠释,不仅能有效回应许多对稳定性的批评,亦提供一个更合理更一致的新向度去理解政治自由主义。

＂Problem of stability＂ has played an important role in John Rawls＇s theories as well as the main reason of his political liberalism shift. Yet this is attacked vigorously by the critics who uphold that absorbing a practical question irrelevant to moral justification is not only unnecessary but also may cause a critical moral compromise and even make an error in concepts. In my view, lack of distinction between moral stability （concern with the pri- ority of the sense of justice） and social stability （concern with the social order and continuity）, which misleads people into thinking the former is mere a mean to the latter, results in these criticisms. I, therefore, propose that moral stability must be independent of social stability and has its importance internalized in moral justification, while the answer lies in the ＂priority of justice＂ demanded by moral stability. This new interpretation will serve as an effective response to many critics on stability as well as a new dimension to understand political liberalism reasonably.