终身教职标准、学术修养与学术生产能力——基于Stackelberg微分对策模型

Study on Tenure Standard,Academic Attainment and Productivity Based on Stackelberg Differential Game Model

针对高等教育领域中一些科研人员在获得终身教职之后为何依然富有科研产出效率这一问题,在跨期优化框架下,提出作为主动者的院系可以通过制定终身教职规则和标准来激励作为从动者的科研人员养成良好的学术修养.通过院系和教师之间动态的Stackelberg主从微分对策模型分析,指出在终身教职规则和标准下形成的学术修养对科研人员学术生产能力具有持久的正效应,可以引致出更高的学术生产增长率和更高的学术生产能力水平.

The problem why some scientific research personnel, especially those in research-oriented universities, remain academically productive after receiving tenure in their field of higher education is put under examination, from which originates the idea that departments can set tenure rules and standards as incentives for scholars to accumulate academic attainment. Within the over-time optimization framework, and through the analysis of the dynamic Stackelberg differential game model between departments and scholars, it is interesting to find that scholar＇s aeademic culture acquired under the tenure rules and criterion tends to exert a lasting positive impact upon their academic productivity, which can result in a higher academic productivity and growth rate.