开发区类企业的企业化博弈演进分析

Analysis on the game evolvement of firm dealing in development zone to be enterprised

基于我国开发区发展瓶颈现象和一个动态博弈模型,指出开发区类企业所具有的特殊的企业形态.该类企业在开发区初创阶段,以完成政府的效用为其义务.政府在开发区发展的各个阶段,其效用函数是不同的.当政府的期望效用基本完成之后,就应当逐渐退出其行政控制.由于政府的政绩诉求和权威惯性,其行政控制的退出往往比较迟缓.通过开发区类企业与政府的利益博弈,开发区类企业逐步完成其纯企业化的过程.这种博弈引发的交易成本可能使得开发区类企业的纯企业化过程时间过长,从而导致整个过程的非效率性.

Based on the bottle-neck phenomenon of development zone in China, the article sets up a dynamic game model to reveal the special conformation of the firms dealing in development zone. This type of firms carries the governmental utility as its duty in the beginning term of zone foundation. Government has different utilities in different terms and should gradually retreat from the administration control to the firm whenever its basic utilities have been fulfilled. However, government usually will defer retreat due to appealing for achievement and inertia of authority. Through the game with the government, the firm completes its process of being a real enterprise. The cost of the game will probably prolong the process of the firm to be enterprised and lead to economic inefficiency.