摘要
康德的道德哲学是奠基于理性概念的,但理性是个没有内涵的空概念。康德提出理性这个概念并非出于知识学的需要,而是出于实践和自由的必要性。康德预设了感性—理性或现象—本体的二元对立,认为我们只有彻底从感性—现象世界抽离出来,才能真正进入纯粹的善和自由的领域。但理性和纯粹的善等属于本体界的概念终究是一个悬设的空概念,不但是反目的论的,而且也是反实践的,它只能依据准则的可普遍化这样一个纯形式的规则,以此规则作为道德律令的根据和论证,但这种论证方法是失败的。康德道德哲学的失败迫使我们思考过一种作为整体而有意义的生活的可能性。
Kant's moral philosophy is based on the concept of reason, but reason is a hollow concept which has no connotation. Kant brought up the concept of reason out of necessity of practice and freedom, not of need of epistemology. Kant prejudged dualism of perception-reason or phenomenonnoumenon. He thought that we come in the field of pure good and freedom only when we get away from the field of perception-phenomenon thoroughly. But concepts of reason and pure good which belong to the field of noumenon are hollow after all, and. these are not only anti-teleology, but anti-practice. These are only in accordance with pure formal rule of universalizability which is taken as basis and demonstration of moral law. But this demonstration is fail. This failure makes us think the possibility of a life which has meaning as a whole.
出处
《福建师大福清分校学报》
2008年第6期40-42,共3页
Journal of Fuqing Branch of Fujian Normal University
关键词
康德
理性
现象一本体
可普遍化
自由
Kant, reason, phenomenon-noumenon, universalizability, freedom