技术创新企业与风险投资者的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Technical Innovation Enterprises and Venture Investors

本文运用定性与定量相结合、规范与实证相结合、博弈论等方法对技术创新企业和风险投资者进行了分离均衡和混同均衡的博弈分析,结论认为混同均衡较难达到,分离均衡虽然在一定条件下总是存在,但却是低效率的。分析认为可以通过降低q值使之趋近于0或减轻信息不对称现象来推进上述均衡的成立。

This paper builds a game theory framework of technical innovation enterprises and venture investors using some economical theories. It is summarized that the pooling equilibrium can＇t be achieved easily, and separating equilibrium is inefficient although it generally exists under certain conditions. We draw an conclusion that the equilibrium can he attained by reducing the value of q and alleviating the extent of asymmetric information.