破解我国国有企业经营者激励难题的可行路径--国企改革30年的反思与前瞻

The Feasible Solution to the Problem of Managers' Encouragement in Stated-owned Enterprises of Our Country——Reflection and Prospect after Thirty Years' of Enterprise Reform

国有企业利益相关者对国企初次收入分配的公平偏好和国企经营目标的多元性,导致政府仍然保留改制后国企经营者的选择权和定薪权,这是造成当前国企经营者激励难题的根本原因。由于中国市场化改革的渐进性和国企制度变迁的路径依赖,这些造成国企经营者激励难题的社会性约束短期内难以根本消除。所以,新时期国企经营者激励制度改革和创新必须另辟蹊径。只有大力借鉴行为合约理论的相关成果,着眼于经营者公平偏好、利他主义等非货币动机的培育和运用,才能实现可行突破。

In transition period, the government still owns the right to choose managers and determine their salaries in the reformed SOE. This institutional arrangement mainly arises from the constraints of SOE stakerholders＇ fair preferences and the multiplicity of SOE operational objectives. These social constraints lead to the problem of managers＇ encouragement in SOE. Because of the gradual process of china＇s marketnization reform and the path dependence of SOE institutional reform, these social constraints can not be removed in a short term. As a result, in order to reform managers＇ encouragement in SOE, new approaches must be explored so that non - monetary motives such as managers＇ fairness preference and altruism can be nurtured and leveraged by using the achievement of behavioral contract theory.