委托代理模型及风险分析

Principal-Agent Model and Risk Analysis

本文从实际出发构造了一类委托代理模型,研究了委托人代理人的风险偏好对激励机制的影响.研究表明:委托人在制定激励机制时应结合自己及对方的风险偏好,这样才能达到有效的激励目的.同时,探讨了协调处理代理人风险分担与风险偏好关系的方法.并通过实例加以分析论证.

This paper describes a principal -agent model from economic life. It deals with the influence of principal -agent＇s risk preference to the optimum incentive mechanism. Result show that principal should be combine agent＇s preference with himself when he formulate incentive mechanism. So that optimum incentive can be achieved. In this paper, a method is given that dispose of relation between agent＇s risk preference and his risk share of incentive mechanism. Finally, a case analysis is presented.