中央与地方政府关于土地政策的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Land Policy of Central and Local Government

在现行土地政策博弈中,由于地方政府处于信息优势和操作优势地位,使得中央的土地政策往往难以发挥保护耕地和农民利益的功能,形成一种管制和征地的恶性循环。因此必须着力提供保护农民土地权益的制度性政策,包括建立让地权所有者直接参与市场交易的机制、消除地方政府"土地财政"激励、修改土地相关法律等。

Under current China＇s land-policy, the local governments have advantage in information controling and actual operation, so it is difficult for the central government to protect arable land and farmers interest, leading to a virtuous circle of controlling and exploiting land. Therefore, it is necessary to improve current land-related laws and policies to protect the farmers＂ rights on land, which include setting mechanism to allow the landowners to participate directly in land trading, as well as eliminating the land financial incentives of the local government etc.