持股结构、决议机制与上市公司控制权

Ownership Structure,Resolution Mechanism and Control Right of Listed Companies

控制权的界定和度量一直是困扰公司治理领域的重大难题,完全控制、绝对控制、通过金字塔等手段控制、相对控制、管理层控制的传统分类方法,单纯以最大股东的持股比例为标准,忽略了其余股份的持股差异,即持股结构的影响。考虑持股结构的概率投票模型有效地弥补了这一缺陷,但由于该方法刚刚兴起,其理论基础尚不完备。本文在三种决议机制下,考虑到股东出席会议的状况,对此模型进行了修正和扩展。结果显示,所有权并不是控制权的惟一途径,还受持股结构、决议机制、股东出席会议和投票状况的影响。

The definition and measurement of the control right always puzzle the research in corporate governance. The theoretical categories of control type defined by the largest shareholder, including complete ownership, majority control, control through pyramiding, minority control and management control, ignored the difference of the residual shares ownership, i.e. ownership structure. Considering ownership structure, probabihstic voting model offsets this flaw. But since it just started, there are some theoretic bases to be completed. This paper modified the model according to the attendance of the shareholders in three resolution mechanisms. The analyses of the model reveal some factors other than ownership, involving its structure, resolution mechanism, shareholders＇ attendance and voting probability.