公司治理影响债务期限水平吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Does the Governance of Companies Affect the Debt Maturity Level?

本文结合中国制度背景,理论推演公司治理与债务期限水平之间关系。接着,采用中国非金融上市公司面板数据,应用混合最小二乘法实证检验公司治理如何影响债务期限水平,采用参数和非参数检验程序实证检验法律制度对债务期限水平的影响。研究发现,公司治理确实影响债务期限水平。实证结果支持了这样的论点——当公司治理水平高时,内部人(管理者/控制股东)受到更严格的监督,更少的管理者壕沟效应,控股股东的机会主义行为受到限制,公司将使用更少的短期债务。这些结果表明公司治理与短期债务的使用之间存在替代效应。

Considering China's institutional background, we have in this paper theoretically deduced the relationship between company control and the debt maturity level (DML). Then, by the use of pooled least squares we have made a case study and verified how company control affects the DML, and we have adopted the parametric and non-parametric test procedure to make a case study and examine the effect of the legal system on DML. After our study, we have discovered that the company control does impact on DML. The results of our case study support the view that when the level of company control is high, insiders (managers and controlling shareholders) are subject to more strict supervision, the entrenchment effect is small, the controlling shareholders' opportunism is curbed, and the company will use less short-term debt. These results show that there is a substitutive effect——the corporate governance can be substituted for the use of short-term debt and vice versa.