保险市场基于保费信号的信号传递博弈模型分析被引量：7

Study on the Signal Transmitting Game of Insurance Market Based on Insurance Signal

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摘要信号传递博弈是不完全信息动态博弈模型中一类简单、重要的博弈模型,它在经济管理领域内有很多应用。用保费作为信号,建立不完全信息动态的信号博弈模型,分析保险双方的博弈策略选择及其可能达到的均衡,研究表明,博弈模型存在某种形式的精练贝叶斯纳什均衡。 Signal transmitting game is a simple and important incomplete information activate game model, which is widely used in economic fields. By using insurance as a signal, this paper establishes an activate signal transmitting game model with incomplete information. Then, the answers are given for buyers and sellers to choose the optimal game strategy and achieve the possible equilibrium. The research shows that the game model has a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

作者杨美琴龚日朝刘玲

机构地区湖南科技大学商学院湖南科技大学组织部

出处《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》 2008年第6期100-103,共4页 Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基金教育部人文社会科学规划课题(07JA790084 07JA790037) 湖南省科技厅软科学重点项目(2008ZK2002 2007ZK2005) 湖南省社科基金项目(07YBB233) 湖南省教育厅优秀青年基金项目(06B34)

关键词逆向选择博弈策略分离均衡混同均衡 reversed choice game strategy separate equilibrium mixed equilibrium

分类号 F224.32 [经济管理—国民经济]

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参考文献5

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