摘要
军品价格规制改革,是摆在当前我国经济体制改革和中国特色的新军事变革面前的一项急需解决的重要理论与实践课题。首先,文章在分析军品价格规制的内涵、技术经济特点及规制约束等问题的基础上,指出了现行价格规制的理论困境与实践困境;然后,文章通过激励性定价的委托代理模型分析,得出规制双方在既定约束下可以实现最优成本分担率与最优成本节约分享率的结论;最后,文章根据军品科研生产的周期性的特点,分阶段设计了相应的混合激励规制合同,为军品价格规制改革提供了初步改革思路。
Confronted with China economy system reform and new military transformation, the military product pricing regulation is an important topic of theory and practice. Firstly, the paper analyses the problems of connotation, techniqueeconomy-characteristics and regulation constraints of the military product pricing regulation. Based on these analysis, the paper points out that the current contract of pricing regulation has lots of theoretical predicament and practical predicament. Secondly, under the analysis of the Principal-Agent Theory of incentive model of military product pricing regulation under the asymmetry information between the army and enterprises, the paper elicits a conclusion that we can carry out the optimal cost sharing rate and the cost saving rate between both sides. Finally, according to the restraints of the different production phase, the paper has designed corresponding incentive regulation contracts which are helpful to offer preparatory thought to the reform of military product pricing regulation.
出处
《南方经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第11期38-49,共12页
South China Journal of Economics
关键词
规制
困境
军品定价
合同设计
激励性定价
Regulation
Predicament
Military Product Pricing
Contract Design
Incentive Pricing