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煤炭上市企业经理人薪酬激励模式创新研究 被引量:2

Executive compensation motivation mode innovation of the listed coal enterprises
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摘要 提出了基于经济增加值的煤炭上市企业经理人薪酬激励模式。依据实现企业价值最大化为激励目标、短期激励与长期激励相结合、相对业绩激励等设计思想,具体设计了经理人年度薪酬收入模型、薪酬银行和年度薪酬支付模型,并给出了模型中参数的确定方法。分析表明,该模式具有四个方面的激励机制:使经理人和股东的利益追求一致,对经理人的奖励具有足够大的可变性,对经理人的业绩实现真实激励,使代理成本保持在一个合理的水平之下。 The EVA (Economic value added) -based executive compensation motivation mode of the listed coal enterprises was proposed herein. According to the design thoughts, including the motivation objective to realize firm value maximization, integration between short-term motivation and long-term motivation, and relative performance motivation, the executive annual compensation income model, the compensation bank, and the annual compensation payment model were specifically designed, and the parameters ascertai- ning methods in the models were also proposed. The Analysis shows that the models comprise the motivation mechanism from four aspects: benefit-seeking consistency between executives and shareholders, enough awards changeability to executives, real motivation to the executive performance, and reasonable level of the agent costs.
作者 王波
出处 《中国矿业》 北大核心 2008年第10期9-12,共4页 China Mining Magazine
基金 黑龙江省高校青年学术骨干支持项目(1153G032)
关键词 煤炭上市企业 经理人 经济增加值 薪酬激励 listed coal enterprises executives economic value added (EVA) compensation motivation
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