信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理

Information Disclosure and Earnings Management around Privatization of State Shares

国有股权私有化是我国国有企业改革的重要措施。国有股权私有化过程中是否存在影响国有股权转让价格的盈余管理行为,以及如何抑制这种盈余管理,是我国国有企业改革中需要予以回答的重大问题。本文以我国通过控制权转移进行私有化的上市公司为样本,研究了国有股权私有化过程中的盈余管理以及信息披露对盈余管理影响的问题。研究发现,国有企业在国有股权私有化前1年和当年的操控性应计项目显著小于0,而私有化后的第1年显著大于0;及时披露国有股权私有化信息的公司在私有化前的操控性应计项目显著大于滞后披露信息的公司。以上结果表明,国有企业在国有股权私有化前存在降低收益的盈余管理行为,信息及时披露对私有化前的盈余管理有显著的抑制作用。本文的研究结论对规范我国国有企业改制和国有产权转让行为具有重要启示。

Privatization of state shares is one of the most important strategies of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reform. The issues of whether earnings has been managed to affect the transfer price and how to constrain such behavior in the process of privatization are key focuses of the Chinese SOEs reform. This paper investigates earnings management around privatization of state-owned shares and the impact of information disclosure on earnings management. We find that the discretionary accruals are significantly negative in the year of privatization and one-year prior. Although SOEs that duly disclose the information about the transfer of state-owned shares have significantly negative discretionary accruals, their magnitudes are significantly higher than those of SOEs that delay the disclosure. These results suggest that SOEs manage earnings significantly downward prior to privatization and timely information disclosure leads to less earnings management. Our findings have important implications for restructuring of SOEs and the transfer of state ownership.