摘要
监督问题是纵向合作困境研究中的一个主要问题。运用基于多Agent的建模与仿真方法,建立了违规与监督的交互规则,用遗传算法设计了其进化机制,并在Swarm平台上进行了仿真。仿真结果表明:在"不完全信息"与"有限理性"的条件下,要使总体违规率演化为零,不仅要使被监督者违规的期望收益小于不违规的期望收益,还要使监督者拥有被监督者行为的近乎完全的信息;重罚加快了演化的进程。
Supervision is important to vertical dilemmas. Interaction rules of supervision and violation were constructed by multi-agent modeling and simulation. The evolving mechanism was designed using genetic algorithm and the evolving process was simulated on the swarm platform. It is concluded that under ＂limited rationality＂ and ＂incomplete information＂, the supervisor must obtain almost the ＂complete information＂ of the behavior of participants, apart from making their expected return of obedience greater than the expected return of violation, to eliminate the behavior of violation. The progress of the evolution can be accelerated by harsh punishments.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
2008年第6期807-812,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70501016)
关键词
合作困境
监督
多AGENT
遗传算法
仿真
cooperation dilemma
supervision
multi-agent
genetic algorithm
simulation
