摘要
借助多重动态博弈分析绩效工资的计量,得出代理人绩效考核中棘轮效应存在的必然性,在委托合同延续的时间足够长的前提下,绩效考核的标准就趋于当前的绩效水平,也就是绩效工资为零。
By analysing the measurement of performance wages with the multiple dynamic gambling, we can get the conclusion that the ratchet effect exists inevitability. If the contract of principal-agent lasts enough long time, the performance appraisal＇s standard approaches the current performance level, and the performance wages is zero.
出处
《长江大学学报（社会科学版）》
2008年第5期84-86,共3页
Journal of Yangtze University（Social Sciences Edition）
关键词
棘轮效应
多重动态博弈
绩效考核
委托代理
ratchet effect
multiple dynamic gambling
performance appraisal
principal-agent
