不完全信息下的专利投资

Patent Investment under Incomplete Information

外部随机发生的事件中蕴含着专利未来前景的不完全信息,这些信息会影响企业的专利投资决策。考虑不完全信息和竞争,建立实物期权投资决策模型,分别得到了单个企业和双寡头企业投资专利所需的临界信念,并进一步分析了两对称企业竞买同一个专利可能出现的均衡类型及产生条件。结果表明,竞争的力量和专利固有的"赢者通吃"特性不仅使得投资所需临界信念降低,由领导者投资后所产生的信息披露效应从而带给追随者的后发优势也将不复存在;同时,出现错误投资决策的概率也随之增大;企业间的竞争均衡可能会出现占先均衡和同时投资均衡。

There is incomplete information about the future prospect of the patent behind the events randomly happening outside, and the information will influence enterprises＇ patent investment decision. In view of incomplete information and competition, by establishing an investment decision-making model of the real option, we obtain the critical belief needed for patent investment from single enterprise and duopoly enterprises respectively and further analyze the likely equilibrium types and conditions when two symmetric enterprises compete against purchasing the same patent. The result shows that the power of competition and inherent characteristic of patent, the ＂winner takes all＂, cause the decrease of the critical belief needed for investing patent, and that ＂information spillover effect＂ generated by the leader＇s investment results in the disappearance of the follower＇s second mover advantages; meanwhile,the probability of a wrong decision will increase with it; The competition equilibrium among the enterprises can result in preemption equilibrium and simultaneous investment equilibrium.