正义与团结——论哈贝马斯的话语伦理学

Justice and Solidarity——On Habermas’s Discourse Ethics

哈贝马斯的话语伦理学一方面追求普遍主义的"正义",恢复道德规范的有效性,同时又给予个体足够的关注。哈贝马斯的正义是包容他者的正义,其自身包含了正义的他者——团结。正义与团结构成了哈贝马斯话语伦理学的双重特性,但这一特性受到了霍内特和后现代学者的质疑。在他们看来,普遍的语用规则不可能真正关涉到主体的真实感受,因而也不可能真正包容他者,在哈贝马斯那里正义与团结并没有真正结合。

Habermas＇s Discourse Ethics, in some respect, focuses on a kind of universal justice in order to recover the validity of traditional moral norm, but simultaneously intends to give individuals sufficient concern. As a result it is also the very justice which includes the acceptance of the other, and thus is called the other of justice, namely solidarity by Habermas. It follows that Habermas＇s Discourse Ethics is characterized as justice and solidarity. Nevertheless such double characters have been questioned by Honneth and some of the postmodem scholars. They argue that it is impossible for universal speech rules to concern the real feeling of a subject, nor to accept the other actually. Accordingly, justice and solidarity, as a matter of fact, do not come together.