资本积累下的动态关税模型——基于互补品贸易的分析

Dynamic Tariff Model with Capital Accumulation——Analysis on the Trade of Complementary Goods

本文是对Calzolari and Lambertini(2007)的模型的一个拓展,尝试性地对在考虑到资本积累下的互补产品进行了动态关税分析。该模型建立在Bertrand-Ramsey竞争的微分对策之上(differential game)。分析表明,该模型同样存在两种稳态:"需求驱动"的稳态和Ramsey的"黄金律"稳态。在"需求驱动"的稳态下,如果只考虑本国厂商的利益且税率足够高,政府就会征税,但降低了本国的总福利;在Ramsey的"黄金律"稳态下,征税提高本国总福利,政府也会征税,前提是对方不征收关税。

This paper develops the model of Calzolari and Lambertini （2007）, and analyses on the trade of complementary goods in dynamic tariff with capital accumulation tentatively. Our model builds on differential game of Bertrand-Ramsey competition. The analysis shows that this model also has two steady states： demand-driven equilibrium and Ramsey golden rule equilibrium. On the assumption that the other side does not levy tariffs, in demand-driven equilibrium, only considering the profit of domestic producers and the tariff rate is high enough, although it will reduce the social welfare, the government will levy tariffs, while levying tariffs will increase the social welfare, the government will levy tariffs too in Ramsey golden rule equilibrium.