摘要
文章在累积创新框架下建立一个附加拍卖的动态博弈模型,研究东道国企业利用外商技术转移实现技术升级的微观机制,以及东道国政府旨在改善社会福利的引资政策。研究后发现:对于核心技术,外商总有激励进行技术封锁;对于一般技术,外商愿意将其技术许可给东道国以赚取垄断利润;东道国企业只有坚持自主创新才能获得技术模仿的机会并最终突破外商对核心技术的封锁;若东道国政府能使外商将核心技术授权给本国企业,本国企业将绕过自主创新从而直接进行模仿创新,若不能有效控制外商技术转移方式但可对仅转移设备等"硬"核心技术的方式采取有效限制,可降低潜在技术模仿成本从而减少东道国激励本国厂商进行创新的补贴成本。最后,文章讨论了我国利用外资推动技术升级的方式。
The paper establishes a dynamic game auction model within the framework of accumulative innovation to study the mechanism of technical upgrading realized by foreign technology transfer in the host country and FDI policies of host country aimed to improve social welfare. Foreign corporations always have the incentives to execute blockage on core technologies, but they are willing to trade the licenses of their general technology with the host country so as to gain monopolistic profits. Only by adhering to independent innovation, the enterprises in the host country can obtain the chances to implement imitative innovations and finally break foreign technology blockages. If the government of host country can efficiently control the mode of foreign technology transfer, domestic enterprises do not need to conduct independent innovation but directly implement imitative innovation. If the government of host country can't efficiently control foreign technology transfer but only can take efficient measurements to restrict the so-called "hard" core technology transfers such as equipment transfer, the potential cost of technology imitation can be reduced and then the subsidy cost which the host country provides to the domestic enterprises for their incentives to innovation will also be decreased. Finally, the paper discusses the ways to promote technology upgrading through foreign investments.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第11期122-133,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社科基金资助项目(06&ZD035)
关键词
外商直接投资
技术许可
模仿创新
自主创新
引资政策
FDI
technology license
imitative innovation
independent innovation
foreign investment policies